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INSURANCE-ILLINOIS LIFE-HEALTH
ALEXANDER K. CIESIELSKI*
INTRODUCTION
N ILLINOIS, as in other states, statutory law was the most important
and certainly the most active source of insurance law in 1971. As
did its predecessors, the 1971 Illinois General Assembly enacted a
number of measures, some affecting specifically and exclusively the
life-health insurance area, others broadly applicable to insurance
generally. The 1971 enactments covered subjects of limited scope,
such as the qualification of actuaries, the grounds for revocation of
an insurer's certificate of authority, and the inapplicability, to ex-
change policies, of the prohibition against back-dating of life poli-
cies for more than six months. Measures of wider scope, such as
basic revisions of the variable contract law, and the addition of
quite extensive provisions relating to the insurance holding com-
pany regulation, were also enacted.' Some of the 1971 enactments
include in substance the model and uniform bills recommended by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.' Most of
the 1971 enactments were incorporated into the Illinois Insurance
Code,8 which when adopted in 1937 was connected with the name
of Dean Havighurst, one of its authors. 4
Consistent with the picture existing in previous years and in most
other states, regulations issued by the insurance supervisory author-
* Assistant General Counsel, American Life Insurance Association; J.D., DePaul
University College of Law; LL.M., Poznan University Faculty of Law and
Economics (Poland).
1. Warchall, Review of State Legislation 1970-71, 1971 AM. LIFE CONV.
LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 245.
2. 1971 NAIC PROCEEDINGS vol. 1, at 9-15.
3. ILL. INS. CODE §§ 1-613, codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 613-
1065.163 (1971).
4. Havighurst, Some Aspects of the Illinois Insurance Code, 32 ILL. L. REV.
391 (1938).
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ity (i.e., the Illinois Insurance Director as the head of the Illinois
State Insurance Department) continued to be both important and
relatively frequent sources of the Illinois insurance law, and reflected
the quickening pace of administrative activity in recent years.' The
1971 regulations cover a wide range of subjects, such as the amend-
ment of Rule 9.15, relating to standards for the formation and man-
agement of insurers; the addition of Rule 3.01, requiring guaranty
fund and guaranty capital certificates of domestic mutual insurance
to be approved by the Insurance Director; and the adoption of Rule
8-1/2.01, prescribing forms to be used in compliance with the statu-
tory requirements applicable to holding companies.
Following the past pattern of insurance litigation across the United
States, the state and federal courts in 1971 contributed only a few
widely scattered decisions affecting life-health insurance law in Illi-
nois.6 No decisions were rendered by the United States or Illinois
Supreme Court, and as a matter of fact it is necessary to go back
many years to find any Illinois life-health insurance decision of land-
mark character.7  Not unexpectedly, a few state appellate and fed-
eral circuit and district court decisions involve the application of
statutes to policy provisions and the doctrine of misrepresentation
(by the insured), one of the main sources of life-health insurance
litigation.
I. LEGISLATION
A. HOLDING COMPANY LEGISLATION
The most important and comprehensive piece of legislation en-
acted by the 1971 Illinois General Assembly, which affects the life-
health insurance companies as well as other insurers, is a set of
statutes relating to "insurance holding company systems." 8  These
5. Ciesielski, Review of State Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1970-71,
1971 AM. LIFE CONV. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 294-352.
6. Bryan, Review of Life Insurance Litigation 1970-71, 1971 AM. LIFE CONV.
LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 226.
7. Taylor v. John Hancock Ins. Co., 11 Ii. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957).
Under the Illinois construction of the phrase, the death of an insured is "death by
accidental means," and recoverable under the terms of a group accident policy
even though the claim arose as a result of a felony, absent a "violation of law"
clause in the policy.
8. ILL. INS. CODE Art. VIII-I/2, §§ 131.1-131.28, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§§ 743.1-743.28 (1971).
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statutes are patterned after the Model Insurance Holding Company
System Regulatory Act, which was recommended by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners for adoption in all states in
June, 1969, ' and which is substantially in effect today in almost
forty states.' 0
The supervision of insurers in their relations with holding com-
panies was brought about by the trend toward the formation and
acquisition of insurance subsidiaries by non-insurance enterprises
and the organization of parent holding companies by insurers, in
order to provide more diversified services, reach larger markets and
secure more stable earning opportunities." The interest of insur-
ers in seeking holding company affiliations derived from severe re-
strictions imposed by the unique statutory framework regulating in-
surance as a business affected with the "public interest,' '1 2 and re-
quiring as a primary objective the solvency of the insurer. 13  Specifi-
cally, two reasons given by a number of life insurers for entering
into holding company arrangements were: to provide "one-step"
financial services, and to provide variable benefits from separate ac-
counts reflecting the performance of equity-based investments as a
hoped-for hedge against inflation, thus responding to the anticipated
patterns of economic growth and social needs. 4
The 1971 Illinois holding company legislation provides that any
domestic insurer, whether stock or mutual, may acquire or form
subsidiaries by investing various limited amounts of its surplus, if
prescribed conditions are met, and with the provision that the in-
vestment in the subsidiary be liquidated when control of it is lost.' 5
9. 1969 NAIC PROCEEDINGS Vol. II, at 738-51.
10. Warchall, Review of State Legislation 1970-71, 1971 AM. LIFE CONV.
LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 245, 290.
1I. Report of the Special Committee on Insurance Holding Companies, Insur-
ance Department, State of New York, Feb. 15, 1968; Report of the Industry Ad-
visory Committee to the Subcommittee on the NAIC on Holding Company Legis-
lation, 1969 NAIC PROCEEDINGS Vol. I, at 176-208.
12. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1945) (McCarran-Ferguson Act).
13. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471
(1961).
14. Supra note 11.
15. ILL. INS. CODE § 131.2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 743.2 (1971).
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It also provides that no one may acquire control of a domestic in-
surance company without disclosing all relevant facts (as specified
in the statute) to the Director of Insurance and to the company's
shareholders, and then securing the approval of the Director.16
The legislation further provides for registration with the Director
of every insurer authorized to do business in Illinois which is a mem-
ber of a holding company system, except those whose home state
has a similar regulation of holding companies. It requires transac-
tions between the insurer and its affiliates to be fair and reasonable,
and specifically forbids payments, without the approval of the Di-
rector, of dividends over any 12-month period above a stated
amount. It also requires that an adequate surplus be left after each
transaction. Either the insurer or any of its affiliates can be ex-
amined by the Insurance Department at any time, at the insurer's
expense.
17
B. UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS LEGISLATION
The states had been laboring under a cloud of constitutional un-
certainty as to the extent of their authority over unauthorized insurers"
until, in 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
validity of state statutes requiring licenses for mail insurers domi-
ciled in another state. "' Following a study of the subject, in De-
cember, 1968, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
adopted the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act2" which is now
substantially in effect in a number of states, 2 including Illinois
since 1971.22
The Illinois act relating to unauthorized companies substantially
follows the NAIC model and provides that it is unlawful for any in-
16. ILL. INS. CODE § 131.4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 743.4 (1971).
17. ILL. INS. CODE § 131.13, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 743.13 (1971).
18. Hanson and Obenberger, Mail Order Insurer: A Case Study in the Ability
of the States to Regulate the Insurance Business, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 175 (1966).
19. Ministers Life & Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d
287 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205 (1966); People v. United Nations Life
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. Rptr. 599, 427 P.2d 199 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 330
(1967).
20. 1968 NAIC PROCEEDINGS vol. II, at 516.
21. Warchall, supra note 10.
22. ILL. INS. CODE Art. VII, §§ 121-1-121-19, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 733-1-
733-19 (1971).
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surer to transact insurance business in Illinois without a certificate of
authority from the Director of Insurance.2" "Transaction of in-
surance" is defined broadly to include "the making of or proposing
to make, as an insurer, an insurance contract,"24 thus clearly en-
compassing the mail order business.
One of the express exceptions from the licensing requirements re-
lates to transactions in Illinois involving group life insurance, group
and blanket health insurance, and group annuities. The master
policy must be issued to a group organized for purposes other than
the procurement of insurance, and where the policyholder is domi-
ciled or otherwise has a bona fide situs.25 This exemption has long
been recognized in most of the states on the theory that a group in-
surance contract is governed by the law of the state where the mas-
ter policy is delivered to the policyholder, and that the certificate of
insurance furnished to the insured is only evidence of the insured's
rights under the policy.26
C. VARIABLE CONTRACT LEGISLATION
Another major legislative development of 1971 in Illinois was the
revision of the law relating to separate accounts2 7 aligning it more
closely with the NAIC Model Variable Contract Law,28 as amended
in December, 1970, and now in effect in a number of states. The
most significant change in the Illinois law, consistent with the trend
in other states, is the newly-granted authority of life insurers to issue
not only variable annuity contracts, but also variable life insurance
policies. It is understood, however, that such policies have neither
been approved nor issued in Illinois, pending the result of the current
hearings conducted by the Securities Exchange Commission2 9 at the
23. ILL. INS. CODE § 121-2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 733-2 (1971).
24. ILL. INS. CODE § 121-3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 733-3 (1971).
25. ILL. INS. CODE § 121-2.06, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 733-2.05 (1971).
26. Boseman v. Connecticut General Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
27. ILL. INS. CODE Art. XIV-1/2, §§ 245.21-245.62, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§§ 857.21-857.62 (1971).
28. 1970 NAIC PROCEEDINGS Vol. 1, at 367-70; 1971 NAIC PROCEEDINGS vol. I,
at 501; see note 10 supra.
29. See Notice of an Order for Proceedings with Request to Petition for Issuance
and Amendment of Rules Requesting Exemption of Certain Variable Life Insurance
Contracts and Their Issuers from the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Fed. Reg. 5510
(1972).
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request of life insurers' associations, to determine whether variable
life insurance is subject to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.30
D. LEGISLATION RELATING TO INSURERS' CAPITAL AND SOLVENCY
Among the acts passed in 1971 are four relating to an insurer's
financial stability and solvency. One act3 increased the minimum
capital required of stock insurers authorized to write life and/or
accident and health insurance to $750,000. The minimum surplus
requirement for stock companies organized after the effective date
of the amendment was raised to $500,000 at the time of the issuance
of the insurer's certificate of authority, and to $300,000 at all other
times. For companies organized prior to the date of the amend-
ment, there is a prescribed schedule by which the company's mini-
mum surplus is to be increased to $300,000 by 1976.
The same measure raised the minimum surplus required of a mu-
tual company"2 writing life and/or accident and health insurance
to $1,250,000 at the time of the issuance of its certificate of au-
thority. At least two-thirds of the original surplus required must
be maintained at all times by companies organized after June 28,
1965. Companies organized prior to that date must maintain a
minimum surplus equal to the amount required when its certificate
of authority was issued. If the minimum requirements are not met,
the Director must take action as prescribed in the case of stock com-
panies, 3 as well. as mutual companies. 4
In another measure designed to protect the insurance-buying pub-
lic, a new provision' 5 was added to the Insurance Code to provide
30. In S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
and Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. S.E.C., 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964) a
variable annuity was found to be a "security" and a separate account to house the
proceeds of variable annuity contracts was found to be an "investment company"
for the purposes of federal regulation (and thus subject to double regulation by the
federal government and the states).
31. ILL. INS. CODE § 13, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 625 (1971).
32. ILL. INS. CODE § 43, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 655 (1971).
33. ILL. INS. CODE § 34, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 646 (1971).
34. ILL. INS. CODE § 60, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 672 (1971).
35. ILL. INS. CODE § 244.1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 856.1 (1971).
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that, whenever the financial condition of any life insurer, when re-
viewed in conjunction with the kinds and nature of risks insured, the
loss experience and ownership of the company, and the ratio of an-
nual premium volume to the incurred acquisition expenses, indicates
a condition such that the continued operation of the company might
be hazardous, the Director may, after notice and hearing, order the
company to take such action as may be necessary to rectify the ex-
isting condition. The Director has the power to order the insurer
to: (a) reduce the loss exposure by reinsurance; (b) reduce the vol-
ume of new business being accepted; (c) reduce general or acquisition
expenses by specified methods; (d) suspend the writing of new busi-
ness for not more than three months; or (e) increase the company's
surplus by a contribution thereto.
Other legislation amended the Insurance Code"0 to prohibit any
insurance officer, director, agent or broker, etc., from renewing, is-
suing or causing to be renewed, issued or delivered, any policy, con-
tract or certificate when the company is impaired. A company is
said to be impaired when its assets are less than its capital, mini-
mum required surplus and all liabilities. Before the amendment,
the provision dealt only with insurance sales by insolvent compan-
ies. A similar amendment 7 provided that mutual companies must
cease issuing renewal policies while an impairment exists. In the
case of mutual companies, an impairment exists when a company's
assets are less than the minimum required surplus and all liabilities.
Both amendments relating to impairments allow for policy renew-
als, despite impairments, when an insured is exercising an option
under an existing policy. Both amendments provide fines for per-
sons who renew, issue or deliver policies while an impairment exists.
E. INSURERS' CLAIM PRACTICE LEGISLATION
Effective November 22, 1971, three provisions were added to
the Illinois Insurance Code38 relating to improper claim practices.
The Director is authorized to issue an order to show cause why a
company's certificate of authority should not be suspended, when
36. ILL. INS. CODE § 144.1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 756.1 (1971).
37. ILL. INS. CODE § 60, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 672 (1971).
38. ILL. INS. CODE § 154.2-154.4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 88 766.2-766.4
(Supp. 1972).
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he determines that it is engaging in an improper claim practice. If,
after a hearing, the Director determines that a company has en-
gaged in such a practice, he shall order such company to cease and
desist and may suspend the company's certificate for a period not to
exceed 30 days.
The following are improper claims practices if performed unjustifi-
ably and as a general business practice: (a) knowingly misrepre-
senting to claimants and insureds pertinent facts or policy provisions;
(b) failing to promptly acknowledge communications with respect
to claims; (c) failing to adopt and implement standards for investi-
gation and settlement of claims; (d) failing to fairly and promptly
settle a claim where liability is clear; (e) compelling policyholders
to sue by offering less than amounts recovered in suits; and (f) any
other unreasonable delay )r refusal to pay or settle claims.8 9
II. ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS AND OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Insurance department regulations and opinions of the Illinois At-
torney General are other important sources of Illinois insurance law.
On April 22, 1971, Illinois Insurance Department Rule 9.15,4° re-
lating to standards for insurers' formation and management, was
amended41 to require that a general description of the type of busi-
ness contemplated, any agency contracts, a detailed 5-year actuarial
projection and biographical data (Exhibit C of Rule 9.13) be re-
ported by promoters, new controlling interests or new management
of domestic insurers, and by those in control or management of
foreign or alien insurers applying for admission to Illinois.
Illinois Insurance Department Rule 2.01, relating to subordinated
indebtedness42 of domestic insurers, was revised as of October 1,
39. This Illinois legislation is similar to recent statutory enactments in other
states, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.4 (XV) (1971); N.Y. INS. LAW § 40-d, (1970);
Pennsylvania H.B. 505 pending in the 1972 legislature. Wis. ADM. CODE § 6.11.
See also 1971 NAIC PROCEEDINGS, vol. II, at 373-74 (1971).
40. Ciesielski, Review of State Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1965-66,
1966 AM. LIFE CONy. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 358, 382.
41. Implementing ILL. INS. CODE § 155.04, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.4
(1971).
42. Compare Ciesielski, Review of State Administrative Rulings and Opinions
1969-70, 1970 AM. LIFE CONV. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 311, 327.
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1971," to provide that a company may only repay principal and
make payment of interest on any indebtedness from its earned sur-
plus as reported in its last financial statement filed with the Depart-
ment. Payment is not to be authorized by the Director unless the
company's surplus, with respect to policyholders, is reasonable in re-
lation to the company's outstanding liabilities, is adequate to its fi-
nancial needs, and does not reduce the company's surplus to less
than the amount prescribed by statute."
Illinois Insurance Department Rule 3.01 effective October 1,
1971, is applicable to all debts of mutual insurers other than those
shown as legal liabilities. It requires guaranty fund and guaranty
capital certificates45 to be approved by, and subsequent agreements
to be reported to, the Insurance Director. A company may only
retire guaranty funds and guaranty capital, and make payment of
interest on any such indebtedness from earned surplus as reported
in the last financial statement filed with the Department. No pay-
ment may be made by a company unless its surplus, with respect to
policyholders, is reasonable in relation to its outstanding liabilities,
is adequate to its financial needs, and unless such payment does not
reduce the company's surplus to less than the amount prescribed by
statute.46 (A parallel provision was adopted in Illinois with regard
to the repayment of any subordinated indebtedness of domestic
stock insurers.47)
On April 22, 1971, Rule 9.13 of the Insurance Department, origi-
nally adopted in 1964, and dealing with the sales of securities,4"
was revised effective May 1, 1971, to provide that a statement of
education, prior occupation, experience and stock ownership (Ex-
hibit C) must be submitted by each new officer, director or organ-
izer of any existing domestic insurer, rather than just those domestic
companies engaged in business for less than 10 years. Thus, all ex-
43. Implementing ILL. INS. CODE § 34.1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 646.1
(1971).
44. ILL. INS. CODE § 13, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 625 (1971).
45. Implementing ILL. INS. CODE § 56, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 668 (1971).
46. ILL. INS. CODE § 43, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 655 (1971).
47. Ciesielski, Review of Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1970-71, 1971
AM. LIFE CONv. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 294, 306.
48. Ciesielski, Review of Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1963-64, 1964
AM. LIFE CONv. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 504, 510.
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isting domestic insurers (exempt from the state "blue sky" laws49)
are subject to Rule 9.13 in its entirety.
Insurance Department Rule 9.17, effective January 1, 1971, as
amended, effective May 1, 1971, is substantially similar to the
NAIC Model Life Insurance Replacement Regulation,50 which ap-
plies to transactions where new life insurance is to be purchased and
existing life insurance terminated or converted. Agents are re-
quired to present "comparison statements" to applicants comparing
the life insurance to be sold with that to be replaced. The Illinois
regulation applies to annuities, although the comparison statement
does not apply to annuities. The regulation does not apply to group
insurance, to employer- or association-paid insurance, to policies dis-
tributed on a mass-merchandising basis, to life policies issued in con-
nection with federally-qualified employee-benefit plans, to non-con-
vertible, non-renewable term policies with 5 years or less to expire, and
where the total cash value of all existing policies is less than $250 and
the sum of their face amounts is less than $2,500.
The Illinois State Salary and Annuity Withholding Act of 1961,
as amended,5 provides that a state employee or annuitant may au-
thorize the "withholding" of his salary, wages or annuity, for pay-
ment of premiums on life or accident and health insurance, as de-
fined in the Insurance Code, if a specified minimum number of re-
quests per insurer is made.5" In his opinion of September 24,
1971,11 the Attorney General of Illinois ruled that such deductions,
in order to be authorized, must be only for an insurance premium.
He concluded that if the payment is partly for insurance and partly
for some other purpose, such as the purchase of mutual stock funds,
under a combination life insurance-mutual fund contract, it would
not qualify as an authorized deduction under the State Salary and
Annuity Withholding Act.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 212-1/2, § 137.3(M) (1971).
50. 1970 NAIC PROCEEDINGS VOl. I, at 345-50 (1970); see Ciesielski, Review of
State Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1969-70, 1970 AM. LIFE CONV. LEGAL
SECTION PROCEEDINGS 311, 345; Ciesielski, Review of State Administrative Rulings
and Opinions 1970-71, 1971 AM. LIFE CONV. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 294, 318-
21; ALC NEWS LETTER, Jan. 8, 1971 at 4.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 351-369 (1971).
52. Ciesielski, Review of State Administrative Rulings and Opinions 1969-70,
1970 AM. LIFE CONY. LEGAL SECTION PROCEEDINGS 311, 359.
53. 338 Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. 1971.
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With regard to credit insurance, Insurance Department Rule
9-1/2.01 (1959) was amended effective March 1, 1971, to elimi-
nate an express provision granting insureds under individual policies
an election to maintain their policies in force until the scheduled ex-
piration regardless of whether the indebtedness is extinguished by
pre-payment or otherwise.
On February 18, 1972, the Illinois Director of Insurance promul-
gated Rule 14-1/2.01 which took effect March 1, 1972. This
rule substantially conforms to the NAIC Model Variable Contract
Regulation, 4 and sets forth standards to be followed by companies
and agents issuing variable contracts. Separate accounts must be
maintained with reserves sufficient to cover the benefits guaranteed.
For the protection of purchasers of variable contracts, there must be
a 30 day grace period, a reinstatement period of one year, and pro-
visions for options on default. Illustrations of benefits payable may
not include projection of past investment experience into the future.
III. CASE LAW: Gibbs v. North American Company for Life,
Accident and Health Insurance
During the past year Illinois courts have handed down few de-
cisions relating to life or accident and health insurance. 55 Only one
54. See 1970 NAIC PROCEEDINGS vol. IIB, at 1185-98; 1971 NAIC PROCEEDINGS
vol. I, at 501-502.
55. Illinois state appellate courts handed down at least three cases dealing
with life or accident and health policies which either restated established law or
turned on procedural or evidentiary matters. In Umberger v. Hospital Service
Corp., 4 Ill. App.3d 123, 280 N.E.2d 264 (1972), the medical and hospital insurer
argued that medical and hospital expenses incurred by the insured were within the
policy exclusion relating to workmen's compensation. There were disputes over
whether or not the insured's injury occurred in his employer's shop and whether or
not the injury was covered by workmen's compensation. The court held that the
insurer had the burden of proving the claim was within the exclusion.
The insured in Horwick v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 282 N.E.2d
222 (Ill. App. 1972) died while covered by a life policy providing a double indem-
nity benefit for accidental death if the insured's mental infirmity did not directly or
indirectly cause or contribute to death or death was not caused by committing or
attempting to commit assault or a felony. The insured, who had a history of
mental illness, was killed while allegedly assaulting his stepmother. The court re-jected the beneficiary's contention that the mental infirmity had to be the direct and
proximate cause of death in order to circumvent the double indemnity provision
and held that the burden was on the beneficiary to show that the exceptions of men-
tal infirmity and assault did not apply. The question as to whether or not death
was accidental was for the jury.
In Maddox v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 267 N.E.2d 723 (Ill. App. 1971) the insured
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case, Gibbs v. North American Company For Life, Accident and
Health Insurance,"6 concerning the expanding area of consumer
credit insurance,17 was significant.
The plaintiff, Walter Gibbs, purchased a car, financing it through
C.I.T. Credit Corporation, and concurrently purchased credit life
insurance. Shortly thereafter he received a form letter from the
President of C.I.T. thanking him for allowing C.I.T. to finance the
purchase and advising him of the importance of procuring credit
accident and health insurance as further debt protection beyond that
afforded by the previously purchased credit life insurance. Addi-
tional advertising was enclosed which urged him to, "Just sign and
mail the enclosed authorization card." '58 The business reply card
that plaintiff signed and mailed read:
Yes, Mr. Watkins I accept the opportunity to be included in your insured Payment
Plan and desire the protection as indicated below:
14 Day Elimination Accident and Health Protection . . . $3.08 per month. I au-
thorize Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation to add the above charge, as indicated,
which includes interest at permissible rate, to my contract and to my monthly
payments, and promise to pay said charge as added. I am the person to be insured
and certify that I am now in good health; also that I have no sickness nor injury
for which I have consulted or been treated by a physician except (give full par-
ticulars): I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this form with Notice of Proposed
Insurance describing coverage.5 9
Plaintiff later received a credit insurance certificate upon which was
stamped, "[d]isability caused by pre-existing conditions is not
covered."
died while covered by a life policy which did not allow recovery for suicide within
two years of the policy date. The evidence introduced during the trial could have
established that death was caused by a wound which could have been either acci-
dental or intentional. The insurer offered a coroner's certified copy of death cer-
tificate stating that death was caused by a gunshot wound in the chest which was
self-inflicted. The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling that the death
certificate was admissible only for the limited purpose of showing that death was the
result of a gunshot wound in the chest. The statement of cause of death in such
certificate is not a fact entitled to the status of prima facie evidence under the Vital
Statistics Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 73 (1971).
56. 2 Ill. App. 3d 496, 276 N.E.2d 49 (1971).
57. The total amount of credit life insurance in force has risen from $3.9 billion
in 1950 to $31.2 billion in 1960 to $87.9 billion in 1970. About 85% of credit life
insurance in force during 1970 was group insurance represented by 70.3 million
certificates issued under 74,120 master policies. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE,
1971 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 33-4; see Credit Insurance Continues Growth
in 1970, SPECTATOR, voL. 179, No. 10, October, 1971, p. 37.
58. 2111. App. 3d at 498, 276 N.E.2d at 51 (1971).
59. Id. at 498-99, 276 N.E.2d at 51.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
After suffering a severe and disabling heart attack plaintiff sued
to enforce his claim, and was awarded a default judgment. After
successfully moving to have the judgment vacated, the defendant
insurer set out in an affirmative defense of misrepresentation, the
plaintiff's declaration in the application for insurance. Defendant
alleged that, contrary to the declaration, plaintiff had consulted and
been treated for hypertension and high blood pressure on eleven
occasions. The insurer further alleged that no certificate would
have been issued if the consultations had been known. 6° The trial
court awarded defendant a summary judgment.
Although on appeal both parties briefed arguments concerning
the effect of misrepresentations in avoiding the policy, the applicable
period of incontestability, and the proper manner of contesting a
claim, the appellate court did not find these considerations to be rele-
vant.6 The court held, 2 that Article IX 1/2, "Credit Life and
Credit Accident and Health Insurance,"6 could not be construed to
include either §766,64 the misrepresentation and false warranty sec-
tion of Article IX, "Provisions Applicable to All Companies, '' 5 or
Article XX, "Accident and Health Insurance." 6  Additionally, the
court found no provision within Article IX 1/2 requiring an appli-
cation to be attached to the policy or certificate, or requiring the
presence of an incontestability clause, or allowing an insurer to
avoid the policy for misrepresentation. However, the court would
allow the insurer to avoid the policy in the case of fraud, or when-
60. Id. at 499, 276 N.E.2d at 52.
61. Id. at 500, 276 N.E.2d at 53.
62. Id.
63. ILL. INS. CODE §§ 155.51-155.65, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.51-767.65
(1971).
64. No misrepresentation or false warranty made by the insured or in his be-
half in the negotiation for a policy of insurance, or breach of a condition of such
policy shall defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrep-
resentation, false warranty or condition shall have been stated in the policy or en-dorsement or rider attached thereto, or in the written application therefor, of
which a copy is attached to or endorsed on the policy, and made a part thereof.
No such misrepresentation or false warranty shall defeat or avoid the policy unless
it shall have been made with actual intent to deceive or materially affects either
the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the company. This section
shall not apply to policies of marine or transportation insurance. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 83, § 766 (1967).
65. ILL. INS. CODE H8 132-155.05, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 744-767.5 (1971).
66. ILL. INS. CODE § 352-370, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 964-982 (1971).
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ever a pre-existing condition caused the liability, and a policy pro-
vision disclaimed liability resulting from a pre-existing condition.
Since no fraud was shown, but since such a provision was con-
tained in the policy, the case was reversed and remanded solely to
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to recover under the policy
provision without reference to the return postal reply card.
67
The concurring opinion 68 agreed that the case was controlled by
Article IX 1/2, and that an incontestability clause was not required
by Article IX 1/2. However, since the insurer had included such
a clause in the policy, he was bound by the terms of his own policy.
The policy's incontestability clause allowed the insurer to use the
insured's statement to contest the validity of the policy only if con-
tested within two years of the date of issue. Since the policy was
not contested within the required two years, the affirmative defense
of misrepresentation not being introduced until the defendant filed
an amended answer three years and five months after issuing the
policy, the insurer could no longer contest the policy.69
A. CREDIT INSURANCE-POLICY PROVISIONS
The court, in effect, has determined that Article IX 1/2 and
the other articles of the Illinois Insurance Code are mutually ex-
clusive, by holding that Article IX 1/2 cannot be construed to
include Article XX and §766, and by basing its final decision solely
on the sections within Article IX 1/2.7' This is an impossible result
because nothing in Article IX 1/2 even suggests that the article
can stand alone. Article IX 1/2 is based on the NAIC Model
Bill to Provide for the Regulation of Credit Life Insurance and
Credit Accident and Health Insurance and was added to the Illinois
Insurance Code in 1959. 71  It was designed primarily to prevent
67. 2 Ill. App. 3d at 500-02, 276 N.E.2d at 53-54.
68. Id. at 501-02, 276 N.E.2d at 54-55.
69. Although the concurring opinion finds Article IX-1/2 to be controlling, the
rationale of that opinion suggests that the defense of misrepresentation is available
to an insurer in the case of credit insurance. An incontestability clause serves no
function unless there is a basis for contesting the policy. In the Gibbs case the
only basis which would be cut off by an incontestability clause is the insurer's de-
fense of misrepresentation. Therefore, in order for the concept of incontestability
to be dispositive, the defense of misrepresentation must be available to the insurer.
70. 2 Ill. App.3d at 500, 49 N.E.2d at 52.
71. Ill. Ins. Laws, 1971 NATIONAL INS. LAW SERV. p. 163; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
73, §§ 767.51-767.65 (1971).
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abusive practices in the sale of life and health insurance provided in
connection with credit transactions, and includes, among other things,
minimum standards of disclosure and a provision for premium control
based on the reasonableness of the premium in relation to the benefits
provided under the policy.72 Article IX 1/2 is not all inclusive and
is not capable of regulating all aspects of credit insurance without ref-
erence to the rest of the Insurance Code. For example, although in
addition to individual policies, Article IX 1/2 covers group credit
insurance, it fails to define what constitutes a "group" and what
underwriting standards a company writing group credit insurance
must meet. Such voids in the statutory scheme can only be filled
by referring to Article XX.
Section 979(1) of Article XX7 3 fills that void by stating that a
"group accident and health policy may be written to insure any
group which may be insured under a group life insurance policy."
Therefore, group standards may only be ascertained by referring to
§842 of Article XIV, Legal Reserve Life Insurance, which specifies
that a creditor group must number not less than 100 new entrants
yearly, who become borrowers or purchasers of property in install-
ments over a period of ten years, for amounts no greater than
$25,000.74
The court mistakenly rejects any reference to Article XX in dis-
72. Consumer Credit Insurance, Nw. U.L. REV. 355, 368-371 (1960); see Hanna,
NAIC Model Credit Insurance Bill Governing the Sale of Credit Life and Health
Insurance, 13 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 127 (1959); see generally, Vernon,
Regulated Credit Life and Disability Insurance and the Small Loan, 29 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1098 (1954).
73. ILL. INS. CODE § 367(1), ILL. REV. STAT. § 979(1) (1971).
74. ILL. INS. CODE § 230(2)(d), ILL. REV. STAT. § 842(2)(d) (1971). The
$25,000 maximum amount of indebtedness as stated in § 842 is in direct conflict
with the specific provisions of § 767.54(a) and (b) which limits the amount of
credit life insurance to the initial indebtedness and the total amount of indemnity
payable by credit accident and health insurance to the "aggregate of the periodic
scheduled unpaid installments of the indebtedness." Indiana Ins. Dept. Bulletin No.
8 of August 15, 1963 construed similar Indiana credit insurance provisions (both
Illinois and Indiana laws being based on the NAIC model acts for the regulation of
credit insurance) and correctly concluded that all group life insurance provisions
applied to credit life insurance except where there is a conflict. However, the
maximum dollar limitation on group life insurance on debtors is not in conflict
with the provision that a group policy of credit life insurance shall at no time
exceed the amount of unpaid indebtedness. Thus, the $25,000 maximum amount
of group life insurance on debtors under § 842(d) is a further limitation on group
credit life insurance which under § 767.54(a) cannot exceed the amount of unpaid
indebtedness.
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tinguishing the types of health insurance regulated by Article IX 1/2
from those regulated by Article XX, by pointing out that the "pro-
ceeds of Article IX 1/2, Credit Health Insurance, are payable to
the creditor, whereas the proceeds of Article XX, Blanket Accident
and Health Insurance,75 are payable to the insured . . . ."" While
that may be true, Article XX also includes §979, "Group Accident
and Health Insurance, "which, with its reference to §842, precisely
fits Article IX 1/2's requirements for group credit accident and health
insurance. Both Article IX 1/2 and §979 (§842) speak of proceeds
under group policies being paid only to creditors, 7  and both limit the
installments to ten years duration. 8 Instead of looking only to Article
XX's blanket accident and health section, describing one type of
group accident and health insurance79 which did not fit Article
IX 1/2's definition, the court should have referred to §979, "Group
Accident and Health Insurance," where the articles overlap. Although
many provisions of Article XX may not be appropriate for Article
IX 1/2, Article XX and other portions of the code not in direct con-
flict with the provisions of Article IX 1/2 should still apply to credit
insurance.
Although Article IX 1/2 was enacted to protect the public, it
does not specifically require incontestability clauses, grace periods,
or other clauses designed to limit the insurer. However, the legisla-
ture's specific requirement that incontestability clauses be included in
forms of life,8" industrial life,81 and accident and health insurance,82
points towards a strong public policy in favor of such clauses.
The Gibbs court's construction of Article IX 1/2, on the other
75. ILL. INS. CODE § 367a, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 979a (1971).
76. 2 Il. App. 3d at 499, 276 N.E.2d at 52.
77. ILL. INS. CODE § 155.53, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.53(d) (1971); ILL.
INS. CODE § 230, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 842 (1971).
78. ILL. INS. CODE § 155.51(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.51(b) (1971);
ILL. INS. CODE § 230(2) (d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 842(2)(d) (1971).
79. ILL. INS. CODE § 867a(1)(e) and (4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 979a(1)
(e) and (4) (1971).
80. ILL. INS. CODE § 224(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 836(1)(c) (1971).
See also ILL. INS. CODE § 226(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 838(b) (1971)
(standard provisions for annuities and pure endowment contracts); ILL. INS. CODE
§ 231(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 843(a) (1971) (standard provisions for
group life policies).
81. ILL. INS. CODE § 229(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 841(1)(c) (1971).
82. ILL. INS. CODE § 357.3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 969.3 (1971).
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hand, would deny this protection to the consumer.83 Such a result
is in conflict with an express provision of Article IX 1/2.
Section 767.56(b), "Provisions of Policies and Certificates of Insur-
ance; Disclosure to Debtors," specifically requires that:
Each individual policy or group certificate of credit insurance, and/or credit acci-
dent and health insurance shall, in addition to other requirements of law, set forth
the name and home office address of the insurer. . . . [Emphasis added].
The reference to "other requirements of law" implies that the legis-
lature did not intend §767.56 alone to list the required policy pro-
visions. Further reference must be made to other provisions of the
Illinois Insurance Code in order to determine which policy pro-
visions are mandatory for credit insurance.
Article XX reflects probable legislative intent and again supplies
a reasonable answer. Section 979, the same section providing the
standards for the formation of groups, provides additional guidance in
sub-section (2) for determining standard provisions not enumerated
in Article IX 1/2. It requires that a policy must contain in sub-
stance "those provisions contained in [§ §969.1 to 969.30] as may be
applicable to group accident and health insurance . . ." and other
provisions listed in §979.84 Sections 969.1 to 969.30, in turn, require
clauses with familiar headings such as "Entire Contract; Changes,"
"Time Limit on Certain Defenses," "Grace Period," "Reinstatement,"
etc., to be inserted into all accident and health policies.8"
Although it may be difficult to determine what provisions of
§§961.1 to 969.30 should be included in a group policy,86 the choice
is really limited by the requirement that all forms be approved by the
Illinois Director of Insurance.8 7  If Article XX or other provisions of
the Illinois Insurance Code do not apply to credit insurance, as the
Gibbs decision implies, the consumer exchanges already established
protection devices for those protections outlined in Article IX 1/2.88
83. 2 I11. App. 3d at 499, 276 N.E.2d at 52.
84. Section 979(2)(a) through (c) lists three provisions required for group
insurance in addition to applicable provisions found in § 969.1 to 969.30. Section
979(2) (a) concerns statements and misrepresentations discussed at note 103, infra.
85. Applicable provisions of § 969.1 to 969.30 should also be inserted in policies
of individual credit accident and health insurance.
86. Neither § 979(2) nor § 969.1 to 969.30 specifically identify which individual
provisions listed in § 969.1 to 969.30 are "applicable."
87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.57 (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 979(2)
(1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 967 (1971).
88. Section 767.56 requires refunds to be given if policies are terminated prior to
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B. CREDIT INSURANCE-DEFENSE OF MISREPRESENTATION
The Gibbs court's holdings prevent an insurer writing Article
IX 1/2 credit insurance from avoiding a policy for misrepresenta-
tion made by the insured. The court held that Article IX 1/2
could not be construed to include §766, misrepresentations and
false warranties, and Article XX, which requires "entire contract"
and "misrepresentations" provisions"9 in line with §766 to be in-
cluded in accident and health policies. The court also looks to
Article IX 1/2 where it finds no provision for avoiding a policy
due to misrepresentation. 0 Finally, it concludes that the policy
could be avoided for fraud or pre-existing conditions if the policy
disclaimed liability for disability caused by pre-existing conditions.9 1
Even though this is a case of first impression, the court unfortunately
has provided little insight into why these holdings are necessary.
What is the state of the law of misrepresentations with regard to
Article IX 1/2 credit insurance? Taken literally, the court's hold-
ing implies that the defense of misrepresentation is not available to
an insurer. This is an unacceptable result because the law of mis-
representation and warranties has been developing as an integral
part of insurance law since the days of Lord Mansfield.9 2  If there
is no statutory provision applicable to credit insurance, then the lli-
nois common law, as developed prior to the passage of §766 in
1937, should prevail." The Illinois common law was technical in
maturity. Section 767.56(a) requires a policy or group certificate of insurance to be
delivered to debtor. Section 767.56(b) requires the insurer to make certain dis-
closures in individual policies or group certificates, such as the name and address of
insurer, identity of insured, and rate or amount of payment, description of the
amount, terms and coverage including exceptions, limitations or restrictions. Addi-
tionally, the policy or group certificate "shall state that the benefits shall be paid to
the creditor to reduce or extinguish the unpaid indebtedness and, wherever the
amount of insurance may exceed the unpaid indebtedness, that any such excess shall
be payable to a beneficiary, other than the creditor, named by the debtor or to his
estate." Section 767.61 allows the debtor to use existing life or accident and health
policies, or procure insurance from someone other than the creditor to secure the
debt.
89. ILL. INS. CODE § 367(2)(a), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 979(2)(a) (1971);
ILL. INS. CODE § 357a(1)(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 969a(1)(b) (1971).
90. 2 I11. App. 3d at 501, 276 N.E.2d at 53.
91. Id.
92. See generally Cooper, Misrepresentations and False Warranties in Insurance
Applications, 58 ILL. B.J. 962, 963 (1970).
93. See generally ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (1971). In Prudential Ins. Co.
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nature and allowed an insurer to avoid a policy even when a false
warranty was immaterial. 4 Later, §766 eliminated the fine distinc-
tion in determining the effect of false warranties and representa-
tions. 5 Without the benefit of §766 or specific sections of Article
XX9" either the insurer has no defenses for misrepresentation as the
Gibbs court implies, or the common law applies, thereby rearming
the insurer with the sudden death effect of the old warranty and
misrepresentation doctrine.17
Confusion over the status of misrepresentations stems from the
court's original failure to look to sections of the Illinois Insurance
Code outside Article IX 1/2.98 If the court had referred to §979
to determine the allowable "group" for group credit accident and
health insurance, it also would have seen §979(2)(a),11 which re-
quires policies of group accident and health insurance to contain a
provision similar to §766. Both §979(2)(a) and §766 make the
applications and policies the entire contract, and statements must be
deemed representations (in absence of fraud) and not warranties,
which may be used in defense to a claim, only if contained in a writ-
ten application. Although §766 requires attachment of the applica-
tion as a prerequisite for a defense of misrepresentation, 100 §979(2)
of America v. Beaty, 456 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1970), the court allowed
an insurer to assert the defense of misrepresentation in order to avoid paying a
claim on a credit life policy where a TB patient had signed an application stating
that he was in good health and subsequently died. The court held that the defense
of misrepresentation had been established as a matter of law. Although Texas insur-
ance law included a credit insurance section substantially the same as Article IX-1/2
and a separate section on misrepresentation similar to § 766, the court relied solely
on case law without making any reference to the statutes.
94. Note, Misrepresentations and False Warranty Under the Illinois Insurance
Code; Recent Developments, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 275, 277 (1959).
95. Cooper, supra note 4, at 964.
96. ILL. INS. CoDE § 367(2)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 979(2)(a) (1971).
97. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (1971).
98. See note 79 supra.
99. A provision that the policy, the application of the employer or executive
officer or trustee of any association, and the individual applications, if any, of the
employees, members or employees of members insured shall constitute the entire
contract between the parties, and that all statements made by the employer, or the
executive officer or trustee, or by the individual employees, members or employees
of members shall (in the absence of fraud) be deemed representations and not
warranties, and that no such statement shall be used in defense to a claim under the
policy, unless it is contained in a written application. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 979(2)(a) (1971).
100. See note 67 supra.
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(a) has no such requirement. The absence of an attachment re-
quirement for group insurance is in line with a previous decision'
in which the Insurance Code was construed not to require an insurer
to attach an application to a certificate of group life insurance in or-
der for him to raise the defense of misrepresentation. There is a
sound rationale behind eliminating the attachment requirement for
group insurance, and replacing it with a requirement that all state-
ments used must be in writing." 2 It is difficult if not impossible to
attach all applications to the master policy, since one master policy
may cover thousands of certificate holders located throughout many
states."10
The above result is reasonable since §979 embodies the spirit of
§766 by eliminating the distinctions between warranties and repre-
sentations to the benefit of the insured, while allowing the insurer
the defense of misrepresentation. The generally applicable provi-
sions of §766 should be modified only when in conflict with the
more specific provisions of §979 or Article IX 1/2.
A similar result is arrived at by analyzing group credit life in-
surance. Standard provisions for group life policies found in §843
(b)010 also make statements representations, not warranties, and re-
quire all statements to be in a written application in order to be
used in a claim defense.
Article IX 1/2 also includes credit life and credit accident and
health insurance issued on an individual basis with the debtors as
101. Coleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 296, 299 (1958); accord, Con-
tinental Assur. Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (1944) (interpreting
Illinois law). Contra, Hofeld v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 287 N.E.2d 215 (111. App.
1972) which was decided after the period covered by this article. In Hofeld the
court held that under § 766 an application for group "disability and medical" in-
surance must be attached to, or endorsed on, the policy in order for an insurer to
assert the defense of misrepresentation. Other sections of the Illinois Insurance Code
were not referred to by the court, and neither Coleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
supra, nor Continental Assur. Co. v. Henson, supra, were cited or discussed.
102. Insured gets a copy of the application in insurer's answer to the complaint.
103. Coleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 296, 299 (1958).
104. A provision that the policy, the application of the employer or trustee of
any association of employees and the individual applications, if any, of the employ-
ees insured constitute the entire contract between the parties, and that all state-
ments made by the employer or trustee or by the individual employees shall, in the
absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties, and that no such
statement shall be used in defense to a claim under the policy, unless it is contained
in a written application. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 843(b) (1971).
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the policyholders. 10  Although the court does not discuss individual
policies of credit insurance, its broad holdings cover all insurance
written under Article IX 1/2. Again, if the court would look be-
yond Article IX 1/2, it would find a statutory scheme in Article
XIV and §766, which recognizes the defense of misrepresentations
for individual policies of credit insurance. A long line of cases has
developed which applies §766 to life insurance and accident and
health insurance. 1 6 Although there is no section within either Arti-
cle XIV, "Legal Reserve Life Insurance," or Article XX, "Accident
and Health Insurance," which specifically refers to §766, courts have
not hesitated to apply §766. Individual credit insurance is basically
term life or term accident and health insurance written under special
conditions. 107 The court has not articulated any public policy re-
quiring misrepresentations to be handled differently in the area of
individual term credit insurance than in the more familiar area of
conventional term life or accident and health insurance.
Unless Gibbs is overturned or narrowed in subsequent cases
dealing with credit insurance, the state of the law in this area will
remain confused.'0 " A literal reading of Gibbs can only leave one
to conclude that Article IX 1/2 alone determines applicable law
and policy provisions for credit insurance.
CONCLUSION
In considering the merits and effectiveness of the 1971 develop-
ments in the Illinois life and health insurance law, it must be borne
in mind that life and health insurance in Illinois (as all insurance in
any state) is (1) a business regulated in the public interest, 10 9 and
(2) interstate commerce within the original federal jurisdiction"
regulated by the states under specific authority from the Congress."'
105. ILL. INS. CODE § 155.53(a) and (b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.53(a)
and (b) (1971).
106. See generally note 95 supra.
107. Article IX-1/2 limits the amount of insurance and requires certain disclos-
ures to be made by the creditors.
108. The Gibbs case was settled before appeal or remand.
109. See note 12 supra.
110. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
111. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (originally adopted in
1945), provides that (1) continued regulation (and taxation) of the insurance
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The brief review of such developments indicates that the state legis-
lature, the Department of Insurance and the state courts of Illinois
made in 1971 some valid contributions towards maintaining in good
order an adequate system of state regulation of insurance.
business by the states is in the public interest, (2) no congressional act shall "in-
validate, impair or supersede" any state insurance law unless such act "specifically
relates to the business of insurance," and (3) certain anti-trust laws shall be appli-
cable to insurance "to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law."
The federal courts, which for the last quarter century assumed the responsibility of
modifying and interpreting the existing division between state insurance regulation
and ever-expanding federal legislation, rejected any basic revision in such division.
Specifically, after having indicated in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Nat'l Cas. Co.,
357 U.S. 560 (1958), that the grant of exclusive insurance regulatory power to the
state will be ineffective if the state statutory provisions which purport to regulate
insurance were a "mere pretense" of regulation, most recently in Ohio A.F.L.-C.I.O. v.
Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 215
(1972), the Supreme Court refused to adopt a strict interpretation of the "to the
extent of . . ." language of Section 1012(b), without considering the substance of
the state regulatory provisions and the effectiveness of their enforcement by state
authorities. See generally Armstrong, McCarran Act Revisited, 1972 American Life
Convention Legal Section Proceedings (to be published early in 1973).
